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Abstract 
The capacity to think about specific events that one might encounter in the 
future—episodic future thought—involves the flexible (re)organization of 
knowledge.  However, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms that guide 
this process.  The reported studies demonstrate evidence for the role of 
knowledge accessibility as one such mechanism.  First, comparisons were drawn 
between episodic future thought and other cognitive tasks that similarly require 
participants to produce open-ended responses and for which the role of 
knowledge accessibility is well established.  Second, three experiments (N = 270) 
provided direct tests of whether accessible knowledge becomes incorporated into 
episodic future thought.  In Experiments 1 and 2, priming knowledge relevant to 
an upcoming episode generation task shaped the content of thoughts about the 
future.  Experiment 3 revealed that, as with other open-ended production tasks, 
primed knowledge must be processed in a meaningful manner in order for it to 
exert an influence on the content of episodic future thought.  These results 
further understanding of episodic future thought and suggest important avenues 
for future research. 
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The capacity to think about specific events that one might encounter in the 
future—episodic future thought—is currently attracting a great deal of empirical 
attention in both psychology and neuroscience (Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Schacter, 
Addis, & Buckner, 2007, 2008; Szpunar, in press).  Perhaps the most appealing 
aspect of this emerging literature is that very little is known about the cognitive 
mechanisms that underlie episodic future thought.  Although a considerable 
amount of research has highlighted the functional benefits of thinking about 
personal future episodes (Boyer, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Taylor, 
Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989), not until recently have 
psychologists and neuroscientists begun to ask how episodic future thought is 
implemented by the human mind/brain. 
 As an example, consider the following scenario generated by a college 
student who had been asked to think about an upcoming life event (Table 1).  In 
contemplating her forthcoming vacation, the participant generated a clear mental 
representation of the context in which the event will take place, the people 
involved, the objects that are salient in the environment, and relevant emotions.  
It is apparent that one must be able to flexibly rely upon one’s existing knowledge 
base in order to construct such a specific scenario (Schacter & Addis, 2007; 
Szpunar, in press).  Indeed, recent findings from neuroimaging (e.g., Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008; Okuda et al., 
2003; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007), neuropsychology (e.g., Hassabis, 
Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Rosenbaum, 
Gilboa, Levin, Winocur, & Moscovitch, in press; see also Tulving, 1985), clinical 
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Table 1. 
A personal future episode from a sample participant 
 
 
Cue: Imagine a specific event that you anticipate happening in your future 
 
 
“I am on the beach in Nice.  It is July, and I have just completed my senior year of college.  I am 
wearing a white skirt and a bright colored tank top, sitting on my old beach towel.  My flip-flops 
are sitting next to me.  I feel the warm sun on my feet.  Next to me, Kelly is asleep, basking in the 
sun, with her huge summer hat over her face.  Hiten and Neha are walking along the water.  I 
think about how they should just get it over with and hold hands, but I know they won’t.  For the 
most part, I am very content to just sit, feel the nice breeze, and watch the waves lap at the 
shore.  It’s a relaxing moment, and I realize it is one of my last before graduate school.  I ignore 
the nervousness building in my stomach, and I lay back and look at the few clouds in a bright blue 
sky.” 
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psychology (e.g., D'Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008), and 
developmental psychology (e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Atance, 2008; 
Atance & O'Neill, 2005; Busby & Suddendorf, 2005) have shown that memory 
plays a fundamental role in the ability to envision personal future episodes. 
For instance, research from the neuroimaging literature has revealed a 
striking similarity in the neural activity that characterizes episodic future thought 
and the capacity to call to mind specific experiences from one’s personal past 
(i.e., episodic memory) (e.g., Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007).  This 
finding has been taken as evidence that similar processes underlie the two 
abilities (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 
2007; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, in press). Of particular interest are posterior cortical 
regions (e.g., posterior cingulate cortex, parahippocampal cortex, hippocampus) 
that are known to play an important role in the retrieval of memories from one’s 
past (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Maguire, 2001; Svoboda, McKinnon, & 
Levine, 2006).  That episodic future thought engages these regions in a similar 
manner as remembering suggests that the contents of memory may in fact be 
accessed as participants think about their future.  In a recent study, Szpunar, 
Chan & McDermott (in press) tested whether posterior cortical regions contribute 
memory-related contents to episodic future thought by manipulating the extent to 
which participants were able to draw upon previous experiences when thinking 
about the future.  In two tasks, participants imagined personal future and past 
episodes occurring in the context of familiar settings (e.g., their apartment).  In a 
third task, participants generated personal future episodes occurring in the 
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context of unfamiliar settings (e.g., a jungle).  Post-scan questionnaires ensured 
that participants had no specific memories associated with the unfamiliar 
settings.  Regions within posteriomedial parietal cortex and the medial temporal 
lobes (previously identified by Szpunar et al., 2007) were similarly engaged as 
participants imagined themselves in familiar contexts.  However, the same 
regions exhibited relatively little neural activity as participants generated personal 
future episodes in unfamiliar contexts.  Hence, it appears that posterior cortical 
structures associated with episodic future thought (and remembering) become 
engaged to the extent that the construction of personal future episodes relies on 
the bringing to mind of previous experiences. 
Importantly, the above-mentioned findings have been corroborated by 
research with neuropsychological patients.  In particular, these studies have 
shown that damage to brain regions associated with episodic memory retrieval 
(e.g., medial temporal lobes) results in an accompanying deficit to the ability to 
imagine personal future episodes.  For instance, Hassabis et al. (2007) studied 
five patients with brain damage limited to the hippocampus (a structure buried 
deep in the medial temporal lobes that is thought to be particularly important for 
episodic memory).  Interestingly, these patients had retained their ability to know 
many things about their past (e.g., names of family and friends, along with other 
general knowledge) but were densely amnesic for previous experiences from 
their lives.  Further, these patients were markedly impaired in their ability to 
imagine personal future episodes.  In line with the findings presented in relation 
to the neuroimaging literature, the authors suggested that both remembering and 
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episodic future thought rely on intact medial temporal lobe structures (particularly 
the hippocampus). 
Finally, the finding that deficits of episodic future thought accompany 
deficits of episodic memory has been demonstrated in a variety of patient 
populations, including suicidally depressed individuals (Williams et al., 1996), 
patients with schizophrenia (e.g., D’Argembeau et al., 2008), children under the 
age of 5 years (e.g., Busby & Suddendorf, 2005), and older adults (Addis et al., 
2008).  Taken together, the evidence suggests a close relationship between the 
personal past and future.  However, it does not specify the nature of the relation. 
To date, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms that guide the 
process of (re)organizing information from one’s knowledge base in the course of 
episodic future thought.  In fact, much of this process likely occurs beyond 
conscious awareness (at least when one is not specifically asked to contemplate 
the process).  For instance, there exists a large amount of knowledge that is 
relevant to any given cue to generate a personal future episode (either in daily 
life or in the laboratory).  Further, the knowledge that is applicable to any such 
cue may potentially be used to generate a large number of alternative scenarios 
(e.g., exactly where the event will take place, who will be involved, what objects 
will be salient, and so on).  How is it that one specific scenario comes to mind (cf. 
Table 1)? 
 The purpose of this dissertation is threefold.  First, a cognitive mechanism 
is proposed that may reasonably be thought to guide the use of one’s knowledge 
in episodic future thought.  Namely, it is hypothesized that episodic future thought 
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incorporates applicable knowledge that is in a relatively accessible state at the 
time a specific scenario is being generated. 
 Second, support for this accessibility hypothesis is gained by drawing 
comparisons between episodic future thought and various other cognitive tasks 
that similarly require participants to generate an open-ended response to a 
presented cue and for which the role of knowledge accessibility is well 
established.  Although episodic future thought represents a new area of scientific 
inquiry, it does share links to existing lines of research, and it is likely that 
significant progress in understanding episodic future thought can be made by 
grounding the concept in our more developed understanding of human cognition.  
Notably, these related cognitive tasks represent three ostensibly unrelated areas 
of psychological research—conceptual implicit priming, impression formation, 
and sentence production—that have previously shared little crosstalk. 
Finally, three experiments are described that provide direct tests of 
whether, and under what circumstances, accessible knowledge becomes 
incorporated into episodic future thought.  Briefly, the rationale behind all three 
experiments is that if accessible knowledge is utilized in episodic future thought, 
then manipulations that influence the accessibility of knowledge (e.g., priming) 
should shape the content of participant-generated episodes.  A better 
understanding of the role of knowledge accessibility in episodic future thought 
should provide insights into this ubiquitous mental phenomenon. 
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Accessibility Hypothesis 
As was alluded to in the Introduction, the mental representation of a 
personal future episode will have many potentially relevant features (i.e., various 
settings, people, objects, emotions) and may result in any number of specific 
arrangements of those features (i.e., scenarios).  The hypothesis of this 
dissertation states that currently accessible knowledge that is applicable to a 
given cue to generate a personal future episode should play an important role in 
determining the specific scenario that comes to mind. 
Some clues for this hypothesis were garnered from an informal interview 
of the sample participant mentioned earlier (Table 1).  The only initial constraint 
placed on the participant was to think about an upcoming life event.  The 
participant claimed that her planned trip to Nice was the first event that came to 
mind (see Appendix A).  One possibility is that this information was both 
applicable to the presented cue and in a relatively accessible state (e.g., possibly 
because of recent thought about similar events).  Further, there were different 
scenarios that the participant could have imagined in relation to her planned trip.  
For instance, she could have imagined a vacation scenario that involved site 
seeing rather than lying on a beach.  Again, the participant reported that she 
thought about the first setting that came to mind (i.e., she had recently thought 
about wanting to be on a beach; see Appendix A).  Indeed, it seems that the 
participant was relying upon readily accessible knowledge to help her complete 
the task. 
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Of course, the descriptions and explanations provided by the participant 
and conjectures supplied by the experimenter afford little in the way of evidence 
with regard to the hypothesis that accessible information might influence the 
content of episodic future thought.  However, this hypothesis is certainly testable.  
Importantly, support for this hypothesis may be gained from examining the role of 
knowledge accessibility in the extant psychological literature involving various 
other open-ended production tasks.  Next, we will briefly review findings from 
conceptual implicit memory, impression formation, and sentence production.  In 
each case, accessible (and applicable) knowledge appears to be given 
precedence as participants generate open-ended responses. 
The Role of Knowledge Accessibility in Open-ended Production Tasks 
Conceptual Implicit Memory 
Over the past 25 years, psychologists have expressed interest in the non-
conscious influence of memory on task performance.  Much of this research has 
been conducted under the guise of implicit memory—revealed when previous 
experiences facilitate performance on a task that does not require conscious 
recollection of those experiences (Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Schacter, 
1987).  There are two phases in the typical implicit memory experiment.  First, 
participants are exposed to a set of materials (e.g., a list of words, pictures, or 
sentences). Second, participants complete an ostensibly unrelated task that is 
actually designed to assess the extent to which information learned during the 
first task (e.g., the word ‘cheetah’) facilitates performance during the second task 
(e.g., complete the word fragment c h_ _ t _ _ with the first word that comes to mind; 
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answer the question ‘What is the fastest animal on the planet?’).  The enhanced 
performance on the second task for items related to previously studied 
information relative to items unrelated to previously studied information is 
referred to as priming.  Information learned during the first phase may facilitate 
performance during the second phase if: 1) stimuli in the two tasks share 
perceptual features in common (e.g., completing the word fragment c h _ _ t _ _ as 
‘cheetah’), 2) stimuli in the two tasks are conceptually related (e.g., answer 
‘cheetah’ to the question ‘What is the fastest animal on the planet?’) or 3) some 
combination of perceptually- and conceptually-driven processes (for a detailed 
review see Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989). 
Of particular interest to the topic of this dissertation are conceptual implicit 
memory tasks.  In the typical conceptual implicit task, participants are required to 
produce an open-ended response that is meaningfully related to a presented cue 
(e.g., produce an answer to a general knowledge question, generate a list of 
exemplars relevant to a category cue, or generate the first word that comes to 
mind in response to a cue word).  As is the case with most studies of implicit 
memory, the question of interest is whether participants who were previously 
exposed to a critical piece of information are more likely to incorporate that 
information into their response at the time of the test.  Indeed, this appears to be 
the case.  For instance, participants are more likely to correctly answer general 
knowledge questions if they were exposed to the answer in an unrelated learning 
phase (e.g., Blaxton, 1989; Challis & Sidhu, 1993).  Similarly, participants are 
more likely to incorporate a critical exemplar (typically of low frequency; e.g., 
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cheetah) during a category instance generation task (e.g., list the first 8 animals 
that come to mind, McDermott & Roediger, 1996; see also Mulligan, 1997; 
Rappold & Hashtroudi, 1991; Srinivas & Roediger, 1990) if they have been 
previously exposed to that item. 
Importantly, the extent of priming that one observes on conceptual implicit 
tasks appears to be sensitive to how meaningfully the critical information was 
initially processed.  For instance, Blaxton (1989, Experiment 1) had participants 
study a list of words under one of three orienting conditions.  Some of these 
critical words were presented next to an associated word (e.g., jaguar—cheetah) and 
participants were asked to read the associate silently (“jaguar”) and then the 
critical word aloud (“cheetah”).  Other critical words were presented with no 
context (e.g., XXX—cheetah) and, again, participants were asked to read the critical 
word aloud.  In a third condition, participants were presented with the first letter of 
the critical word next to an associated word (e.g., jaguar—c___) and were asked to 
generate the critical word from the cue (see also Jacoby, 1983). 
Among the various tests subsequently administered by Blaxton was a 
conceptual implicit memory task that required a subset of participants to answer 
general knowledge questions (e.g., ‘What is the fastest animal on earth?’).  Regardless of 
orienting task, prior exposure to the critical words enhanced the probability that 
participants came up with a correct answer to general knowledge questions 
(Figure 1).  However, as can be seen in Figure 1, participants were most likely to 
correctly answer general knowledge questions related to the critical words they 
had generated, followed by questions related to words they had read in context,  
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Figure 1. Proportion general knowledge questions correct as a function of 
exposure condition (data adapted from Blaxton, 1989). 
 12 
and finally questions related to words they had read with no context.  This finding 
was attributed to the idea that generating a critical word in relation to an 
associate necessarily engages conceptual processes, while reading a critical 
word without context probably does so to a lesser extent (and likely less so than 
reading a critical word in context).  However, since the no-context condition did 
show some priming, it is likely that some meaning-based processing was 
engaged by simply reading the critical words.  Indeed, Srinivas and Roediger 
(1990, Experiment 1) showed that disrupting conceptual processing (i.e., by 
inducing structural processing of the stimulus in the exposure phase) eliminated 
priming on a conceptual implicit task (they also used general knowledge 
questions).  This point will be rehashed in discussing the rationale behind 
Experiment 3 of this dissertation. 
Taken another way, the research on conceptual implicit memory 
discussed above suggests that accessible (and applicable) information plays an 
important role when participants are required to produce an open-ended 
response that is meaningfully related to a cue.  That is, information in the 
participant’s knowledge base that is applicable to the task at hand and also in a 
relatively accessible state (as a result of prior exposure; especially if that 
exposure involved processing the critical item in a meaningful way) will influence 
the semantic content of the participant’s response (see also Blaxton, 1989, 
Experiment 3; Brown & Mitchell, 1994; Hamann, 1990; Mulligan, 1997).  Next, we 
turn to an ostensibly unrelated line of research in the social psychological 
literature that has examined the role of category accessibility on impression 
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formation.  As will be seen, the methods employed by researchers studying 
impression formation bear a close resemblance to those employed in the implicit 
memory literature.  Indeed, the general pattern of empirical regularities that has 
emerged from studies of conceptual implicit memory appears to hold in relevant 
studies of impression formation. 
Impression Formation 
A considerable amount of research in the social psychological literature 
has been directed towards delineating the role of category accessibility on 
person perception (e.g., DeCoster & Claypool, 2004; Forster & Liberman, 2007; 
Higgins, 1996; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980).  The basic underlying assumption of 
this line of research is that people use broad conceptual categories to encode 
information about behavior into memory (Bartlett, 1932; Bruner, 1957).  In many 
instances, however, behaviors that one observes are ambiguous and may be 
interpreted in more than one way.  For instance, Srull and Wyer (1979) give the 
example of someone telling his girlfriend that her new hairstyle is unattractive.  
This behavior could potentially be interpreted as either ‘honest’ or ‘unkind’.  Srull 
and Wyer (see also Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977) suggest that the manner in 
which ambiguous behaviors, such as the one described above, are interpreted 
depends on the concepts that are currently accessible in one’s knowledge base 
(cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
In their seminal study, Higgins et al. (1977) provided direct evidence for 
the role of knowledge accessibility in impression formation.  The study involved 
two ostensibly unrelated phases.  In the first phase, different groups of 
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participants were exposed to various trait terms.  In the second phase (presented 
as a separate experiment), participants read a vignette about an unfamiliar 
individual (Donald) who performed a series of ambiguous behaviors that could 
either be regarded as ‘adventurous’ or ‘reckless’ (e.g., Donald thought about 
crossing the Atlantic in a sailboat).  The manipulation of interest was whether, in 
the first phase of the experiment, participants had been exposed to trait terms 
related to adventurousness or recklessness.  If accessible category knowledge 
(i.e., as a result of recent exposure) is used to interpret ambiguous behavior, 
then participants should produce descriptions of Donald that are congruent with 
the previously presented trait terms.  As can be seen in Figure 2, participants 
who had been exposed to adventure-related terms were more likely to describe 
the ambiguous behavior positively (e.g., adventurous, brave, courageous) 
whereas participants who had been exposed to reckless-related terms were 
more likely to describe Donald’s behavior negatively (e.g., reckless, self-
centered, stubborn).   
Several important points about the Higgins et al. (1977) experiment 
deserve mention.  First, the structure of the experiment (i.e., two unrelated 
phases) represents the modal experimental design that is used to study 
impression formation.  Although the nature of the exposure phase (e.g., 
presenting individual words, presenting sentences, and so on) and the nature of 
the description provided by participants in the second phase (e.g., an open-
ended description, rating a specific trait on a Likert scale) may vary, the general 
design is clearly similar to those discussed in relation to conceptual implicit  
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Figure 2. Proportion of impression types generated as a function of exposure 
condition (data adapted from Higgins et al., 1977).
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memory tasks.  Importantly, the Higgins et al. experiment required participants to 
generate a response (i.e., describe Donald’s behavior) rather than rate the 
ambiguous behavior along a relevant dimension (e.g., how adventurous was 
Donald?).  In that sense, this experiment (along with others, e.g., Higgins, Bargh, 
& Lombardi, 1985) can be considered an examination of the role of knowledge 
accessibility on the production of an open-ended response (as was the case with 
conceptual implicit memory tasks). 
 Finally, the level of priming obtained on impression formation tasks has 
also been shown to depend on the extent to which the primed information is 
processed in a meaningful way.  Smith and Branscombe (1988) showed that 
participants who had generated trait terms from conceptual cues were more likely 
to show priming in their description of an ambiguous behavior than participants 
who had simply read the trait terms.  As discussed above, this is a consistent 
feature of conceptual implicit memory tasks (see Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 
1989).  Next, we will consider some converging evidence for the role of 
accessible information in an open-ended sentence production task. 
Sentence Production 
   The role of accessible (and applicable) information has also received 
some attention in studies of sentence production.  Bock and her colleagues (e.g., 
Bock, 1982; Bock & Irwin, 1980) have shown that the syntactical structure of 
participant-generated sentences may be influenced by lexical information that is 
in a temporarily accessible state (i.e., as a result of recent exposure).  Although 
many of these studies have focused on the reproduction of sentences from 
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memory (e.g., Bock & Irwin, 1980; Perfetti & Goldman, 1975), others have 
examined tasks in which production is more open-ended.  For instance, 
participants in one study (Bock, 1986) were asked to describe a series of pictures 
depicting events involving an agent and a patient (e.g., a bee stinging a man).  
Although each picture could potentially be described in a number of alternative 
ways, Bock was particularly interested in two descriptions that participants 
typically came up with:  1) an active sentence (e.g., “the bee is stinging the 
man”), in which the agent is mentioned first and 2) its corresponding passive 
(e.g., “the man is being stung by a bee”), in which the patient is mentioned first.  
Importantly, participants were unconstrained in how they chose to describe the 
pictures.  The manipulation of interest, for our purposes, was whether 
participants were primed (immediately before seeing the picture) with an auditory 
presentation of a word that was semantically related to either the agent (e.g., 
honey) or the patient (e.g., adult) depicted in the event. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, significantly more sentences were generated 
with the primed target (i.e., agent or patient) mentioned first.  Interestingly, 
phonological primes related to the agent (e.g., fee) or patient (e.g., can) had no 
effect on the syntactical structure of participant generated sentences.  
Participants were required to process each picture in a meaningful way in order 
to produce accurate descriptions of the depicted events.  Hence, only the 
accessibility of information related to the meanings of words (which was 
applicable to the nature of their task) affected the syntax of the generated 
sentences (see also Garrett, 1975, 1980).  Taken another way, these results  
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Figure 3. Proportion of participant generated sentences in which primed target 
words (i.e., agent or patient) were mentioned first or second (data adapted from 
Bock, 1986). 
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represent further evidence that temporarily accessible (and applicable) 
information may influence the product of an open-ended response, in this case 
the syntactical structure of a sentence. 
Relevance to Episodic Future Thought 
 One may reasonably infer, based on the above review of three ostensibly 
unrelated lines of research, that accessible (and applicable) knowledge has a 
strong influence on open-ended production tasks.  As such, confidence is gained 
in the hypothesis that a similar pattern of results might emerge in the context of 
episodic future thought.  To the extent that episodic future thought is open-ended 
(i.e., based on initial constraints; e.g., task instructions), relevant information that 
is in a relatively accessible state should determine the content of a participant-
generated episode.  Such an outcome would provide insight into this little 
understood, but ubiquitous, mental phenomenon.  This hypothesis was the focus 
of Experiments 1 and 2 of this dissertation. 
 Further, because parallels have been drawn between episodic future 
thought and other open-ended production tasks, it will be important to 
demonstrate that certain variables known to influence open-ended production in 
general have a similar influence on episodic future thought.  As was discussed 
above, the extent to which primed knowledge biases performance on conceptual 
implicit tasks, impression formation tasks, and sentence production tasks 
depends on how meaningfully that information is initially processed.  Experiment 
3 will examine whether a similar pattern of results emerges in the context of 
episodic future thought. 
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Introduction to the Experiments 
 Three experiments were conducted to begin to answer the question of 
interest: What is the role of knowledge accessibility in episodic future thought?  In 
order to gain some leverage on this issue, a priming paradigm was implemented 
that bears a family resemblance to those discussed earlier in relation to implicit 
memory, impression formation, and sentence production.  That is, the paradigm 
was designed to examine whether participant-generated episodes of the future  
would be influenced by relevant information that they had been exposed to on an 
earlier, ostensibly unrelated, exposure task. 
 Specifically, in each of the experiments that will be discussed below, 
participants were instructed to complete a series of three mental manipulation 
tasks: 1) constructing sentences from scrambled arrangements of words, 2) 
solving math problems, and 3) generating a personal future episode.  The cover 
story was that the experimenter was interested in whether participants who are 
good at mentally manipulating one type of information (i.e., verbal or non-verbal) 
are also good at mentally manipulating other types of information.  In reality, the 
sentence construction task (which was always completed first in the context of a 
between-subjects design) did or did not prime participants with knowledge 
relevant to the third, and final, episode generation task.  The question of interest, 
in all three experiments, was whether (and under what circumstances) 
knowledge that was made accessible through priming would shape the content of 
participant-generated episodes.  The mental math task simply served as a brief 
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delay between the exposure phase and episode generation phase, and to 
enhance the credibility of the cover story. 
Experiment 1: Knowledge Accessibility in Episodic Future Thought 
 The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine whether, given a 
predetermined set of constraints, the content of episodic future thought would be 
influenced by applicable knowledge that was in a relatively accessible state.  
Specifically, participants in this experiment were asked to generate a personally 
relevant future event that might occur on or near their school campus within the 
next week.  The constraints of this episode generation task were that the event 
must occur in a specific setting (on or near school campus) and within a specific 
time frame (next week).  As such, the instructions delimited the information that 
could potentially become incorporated into the episode.  Nonetheless, there 
remain a large number of scenarios that participants could potentially imagine in 
relation to this cue.  The question of interest was whether participants would be 
more likely to generate social (e.g., going to a party) or academic (e.g., going to 
class) scenarios after they had been primed to think about information relevant to 
similar situations (i.e., social or academic) in the context of an earlier task. 
Before this experiment is outlined in more detail, one issue deserves 
mention.  Although students are likely to think about events that occur on or near 
their school campus in their daily lives, it is unlikely that they are ever asked to 
think about the first such event that comes to mind.  Rather, episodic future 
thought typically reflects events that one is currently excited or anxious about 
(which, for a student, may often times involve a campus related setting).  
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However, in order to make the study of knowledge accessibility in episodic future 
thought tractable, it is necessary to introduce experimentally defined constraints 
on episodic future thought.  That way, the experimenter can have an idea of what 
types of situations are applicable to a given cue and examine whether making 
knowledge related to a specific situation more accessible will shape the content 
of participant-generated episodes. 
Design 
 There was one between-subjects variable, with 3 levels (priming condition: 
social group, academic group, control group), in this experiment.  Notably, a 
between-subjects design was instantiated (in all 3 experiments) based on well-
documented evidence from the social psychological literature that significant 
effects of priming are difficult to obtain when multiple concepts are primed in a 
single experimental session (e.g., DeCoster & Claypool, 2004). 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty undergraduates were recruited for each level of the between 
subjects variable, yielding a total of 90 participants for this experiment.  Two-
thirds of the participants in each condition were tested at Washington University 
in St. Louis and one-third were tested at Iowa State University. 
Materials 
A separate set of materials was administered in each of the three phases 
of the experiment (i.e., sentence construction, math, episode generation).  During 
the sentence construction phase (phase 1), participants generated meaningful 
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sentences in response to scrambled arrangements of words (c.f. Costin, 1969; 
Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980).  A total of 30 scrambled word cues were used in this 
experiment (see Appendix B for a complete list of stimuli).  Six of these 
scrambled word cues specified social situations, 6 were related to academic 
situations, and 18 were control cues that did not converge on a specific situation.  
During the delay period (phase 2), participants were asked to solve 6 
multiplication problems [e.g., (6 x 13)/2 = ?].  Finally, in the episode generation 
phase (phase 3), participants were asked to construct a personally relevant 
future event that might occur on or near their school campus within the next week 
(see Appendix C for complete set of instructions). 
Procedure 
Participants were initially informed that this experiment was designed to 
test their ability to mentally manipulate verbal (sentence construction) and non-
verbal (math and episode generation) stimuli.  Further, it was explained to them 
that the experimenter was interested in whether people who are good at mentally 
manipulating one type of stimuli are also good at mentally manipulating other 
types of stimuli.  Accordingly, participants were asked to complete each one of 
the three tasks as quickly and as accurately as possible.  Finally, participants 
were told that the three tasks would be presented in random order.  In fact, the 
order of task presentation was consistent across participants (i.e., sentence 
construction, math, episode generation). 
 In the first phase of the experiment, each participant was presented with 
18 (of 30) scrambled word cues.  The scrambled word cues appeared one at a 
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time in the center of a computer screen and each contained 5 words that were 
arranged in a nonsensical order (e.g., fun the was party boring).  Participants 
were required to use 4 of the words in each cue to generate a sentence that was 
most relevant to them (e.g., the party was fun) and to type in their responses as 
quickly as possible.  Responses were typed in a space provided directly below 
each cue. 
 Participants in the social group were presented with 6 scrambled word 
cues that could be used to generate sentences related to social situations and 12 
cues that did not converge on a specific situation.  The order of presentation of 
the scrambled word cues was such that the 6 social cues appeared in positions 
three, six, nine, twelve, fifteen, and eighteen.  The remaining 12 positions drew a 
random selection of 12 of the 18 control cues.  Participants in the academic 
group completed the experimental task in the same fashion, with the following 
exception.  These participants were presented with 6 scrambled word cues that 
could be used to generate sentences related to academic situations, rather than 
social situations (but also appearing in positions three, six, nine, twelve, fifteen, 
and eighteen).  Finally, participants in the control group were presented with (in 
random order) all 18 scrambled word cues that did not converge on a specific 
situation. 
 In the second phase, all participants were presented with 6 math 
problems.  These math problems appeared one at a time in the center of a 
computer screen.  Participants were required to answer these problems as 
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quickly as possible.  Responses were typed in a space provided directly below 
each question. 
 In the third phase, all participants were asked to construct a personally 
relevant future event that might occur on or near their school campus within the 
next week.  Participants were instructed that they had two minutes to describe 
the event in as much detail as possible.  Responses were typed in a space 
provided directly below the cue. 
Finally, upon completing the experiment, all participants were asked two 
questions that served as a manipulation check.  First, participants were asked to 
guess the true purpose of the experiment.  Second, participants were asked to 
indicate when they initially became aware of this purpose.  The data of any 
participant who claimed that information from the sentence construction phase 
influenced the nature of their episodic future thought, and who was aware of this 
influence during the course of the experiment, was excluded from analysis.  The 
entire experiment took approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
Results and Discussion 
Scoring Criteria 
All 90 participant-generated episodes were classified as either depicting a 
social, academic, or unrelated scenario by two independent raters who were 
blind to experimental conditions.  Raters were instructed to score a scenario as 
‘social’ if the depicted event focused on the participant’s social interactions with 
others (e.g., attending a party, eating lunch with a group of friends at school), as 
‘academic’ if the event focused on the participant’s academic obligations (e.g., 
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attending class, studying for a test), and as ‘unrelated’ if the event did not 
constitute a social or academic activity (e.g., walking around campus, waking up 
in the morning). 
 The resulting inter-rater reliability was high, Κ = .91 (Cohen, 1960).  Any 
disagreements between raters were discussed and assigned to a single 
category.  This was only the case for 5 events.  Exclusion of these events did not 
change the general pattern of results and so these events were included in all 
subsequent analyses. 
Manipulation Check 
All 90 participants were unaware of the true purpose of the experiment at 
the time they generated their episodic future thought.  In fact, once prompted to 
guess the true purpose of the experiment, only one participant was able to do so.  
This participant was in the academic group.  Interestingly, they did not generate 
an episode that was congruent with the primes they had been exposed to earlier 
(i.e., academically relevant sentences).  Since this individual claimed that they 
were not aware of the purpose until they had been instructed to think about it, 
their data was included in all subsequent analyses (cf. Schacter, Bowers, & 
Booker, 1989). 
Distribution of Events 
The distribution of future episodes generated by participants in the social, 
academic, and, control groups is presented in Figure 4.  In order to examine 
whether recent exposure to relevant information (i.e., situations depicted in  
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Figure 4.  Results for Experiment 1. Proportion of event types generated as a 
function of priming condition.  Relative to the control group, participants in the 
social group generated more socially relevant future thoughts.  Similarly, 
participants in the academic group generated more academically relevant future 
thoughts than those in the control group. 
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sentences) shaped the content of participant generated episodes, the distribution 
of events generated by participants in the social and academic groups were 
separately contrasted against the distribution of events generated by participants 
in the control group. 
First, a chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the distribution of 
events generated by participants in the social group (i.e., 21 ‘social’ scenarios, 6 
‘academic’ scenarios, and 3 ‘unrelated’ scenarios) differed significantly from the 
distribution of events generated by participants in the control group (i.e., 14 
‘social’ scenarios, 8 ‘academic’ scenarios, and 8 ‘unrelated’ scenarios), χ2 (2, N= 
30) = 7.13, p = .028.  This analysis was followed with three a-priori contrasts that 
separately examined the difference in proportions of ‘social’, ‘academic’, and 
‘unrelated’ events generated by the social and control groups.  Two comparisons 
reached significance. Critically, participants in the social group were more likely 
to generate a socially relevant scenario than those in the control group (Z = 1.87, 
p = .031).  Further, participants in the control group were more likely to generate 
an unrelated scenario than those in the social group (Z = 1.77, p = .038). 
A second chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the distribution of 
events generated by participants in the academic group (i.e., 13 ‘social’ 
scenarios, 15 ‘academic’ scenarios, and 2 ‘unrelated’ scenarios) also differed 
significantly from the distribution of events generated by the control group (i.e., 
14 ‘social’ scenarios, 8 ‘academic’ scenarios, and 8 ‘unrelated’ scenarios), χ2 (2, 
N= 30) = 10.69, p =.005.  This analysis was also followed with three a-priori 
contrasts that separately examined the difference in proportions of ‘social’, 
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‘academic’, and ‘unrelated’ events generated by the academic and control 
groups.  Two comparisons reached significance.  Critically, participants in the 
academic group were more likely to generate an academically relevant scenario 
than those in the control group (Z = 2.47, p = .007).  Further, participants in the 
control group were more likely to generate an unrelated scenario than those in 
the academic group (Z = 2.12, p = .017). 
Discussion 
These results present clear evidence that knowledge accessibility 
influences the content of episodic future thought.  Participants in the social and 
academic groups were more likely than would be expected by chance to 
generate future episodes that were congruent with the relevant information that 
they had recently been exposed to in the context of a sentence construction task 
(i.e., social and academic situations, respectively). 
Experiment 2: Knowledge Accessibility with Higher Levels of Constraint 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to extend the generality of the findings 
from Experiment 1 (that knowledge accessibility influences the content of 
episodic future thought).  In Experiment 1, episodic future thought was 
constrained to a specific setting (on or near school campus) and time frame (next 
week).  In Experiment 2, an additional constraint was introduced into the 
instructions specifying the nature of the episode generation task.  Specifically, 
participants in this experiment were asked to construct a personally relevant 
future event that might occur on or near their school campus within the next week 
and that was related to an academic situation.  That is, the episode was 
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constrained to a specific setting (on or near school campus), a specific time 
frame (next week), and a specific activity (academic).  While this additional 
constraint should further delimit the amount of knowledge that is applicable to the 
episode, there still exist a large number of alternative scenarios that one could 
potentially generate in response to this cue.  The question of interest was 
whether participants would be more likely to generate an academically related 
scenario occurring in the context of a classroom (e.g., attending a lecture) or 
outside the classroom (e.g., studying in the library) after they had been primed to 
think about information relevant to similar situations (i.e., academic situations 
occurring inside or outside the classroom) in the context of an earlier task. 
Design 
  There was one between-subjects variable, with 3 levels (priming condition: 
classroom group, study group, control group), in this experiment. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty undergraduates were recruited for each level of the between 
subjects variable, yielding a total of 90 participants for this experiment.  Two-
thirds of the participants in each condition were tested at Washington University 
in St. Louis and one-third were tested at Iowa State University. 
Materials 
A separate set of materials was administered in each of the three phases 
of the experiment (i.e., sentence construction, math, simulation).  During the 
sentence construction phase (phase 1), participants generated meaningful 
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sentences in response to scrambled arrangements of words.  A total of 30 
scrambled word cues were used in this experiment (see Appendix B for a 
complete list of stimuli).  Six of these scrambled word cues specified classroom 
situations, 6 were related to studying outside the classroom, and 18 were control 
cues that did not converge on a specific situation (same control cues as 
Experiment 1).  During the delay period (phase 2), participants were asked to 
solve 6 math problems [e.g., (6 x 13)/2 = ?] (same problems as Experiment 1).  
Finally, in the episode generation phase (phase 3), participants were asked to 
construct a personally relevant future event that might occur on or near their 
school campus within the next week and that was related to an academic 
situation (see Appendix C for complete set of instructions). 
Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1, with 
the following exceptions.  Participants in the classroom group were presented 
with 6 scrambled word cues that could be used to generate sentences related to 
academic situations occurring in the classroom and participants in the study 
group were presented with 6 scrambled word cues that could be used to 
generate sentences related to academic situations occurring outside the 
classroom (participants in both groups were also presented with 12 scrambled 
word cues that did not converge on a specific situation).  As was the case in 
Experiment 1, participants in the control group were presented with (in random 
order) all 18 scrambled word cues that did not converge on a specific situation.  
After the intervening delay phase (i.e., math problems), participants in all three 
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groups were asked to construct a personally relevant future event that might 
occur on or near their school campus within the next week and that was related 
to an academic situation.  The entire experiment, including the manipulation 
check, took approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
Results and Discussion 
Scoring Criteria 
All 90 participant-generated episodes were classified as either depicting 
an academic activity occurring inside the classroom, an academic activity 
occurring outside the classroom, or an unrelated scenario by two independent 
raters who were blind to experimental conditions.  Raters were instructed to 
score a scenario as ‘classroom’ if the depicted event took place in the context of 
an academic class (e.g., listening to a lecture, taking a test), as ‘study’ if the 
event involved preparation for an upcoming academic obligation (e.g., studying in 
the library or at home), and as ‘unrelated’ if the event did not constitute an 
academic activity occurring inside or outside the classroom (e.g., walking 
between classes, purchasing materials for class). 
 The resulting inter-rater reliability was high, Κ = .95.  Any disagreements 
between raters were discussed and assigned to a single category.  This was only 
the case for 3 events.  Exclusion of these events did not change the general 
pattern of results and so these events were included in all subsequent analyses. 
Manipulation Check 
All 90 participants were unaware of the true purpose of the experiment at 
the time they generated their episodic future thought.  In fact, once prompted to 
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guess the true purpose of the experiment, only one participant was able to do so.  
This participant was in the classroom group.  As was the case in Experiment 1, 
this participant did not generate an episode that was congruent with the primes 
they had been exposed to earlier (i.e., sentences related to academic situations 
occurring in the classroom).  Since this individual claimed that they were not 
aware of the purpose until they had been instructed to think about it, their data 
were included in all subsequent analyses. 
Distribution of Events 
The distribution of future episodes generated by participants in the 
classroom, study, and control groups is presented in Figure 5.  In order to 
examine whether recent exposure to relevant information (i.e., situations 
depicted in sentences) shaped the content of participant generated episodes, the 
distribution of events generated by participants in the classroom and study 
groups were separately contrasted against the distribution of events generated 
by participants in the control group. 
 First, a chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the distribution of 
events generated by participants in the classroom group (i.e., 10 ‘classroom’ 
scenarios, 9 ‘study’ scenarios, and 11 ‘unrelated’ scenarios) differed significantly 
from the distribution of events generated by participants in the control group (i.e., 
5 ‘classroom’ scenarios, 11 ‘study’ scenarios, and 14 ‘unrelated’ scenarios), χ2 
(2, N= 30) = 6.01, p = .049.  This analysis was followed with three a-priori 
contrasts that separately examined the difference in proportions of ‘classroom’,  
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Figure 5.  Results for Experiment 2. Proportion of event types generated as a 
function of priming condition.  Relative to the control group, participants in the 
classroom group generated more academically relevant future thoughts occurring 
in the classroom.  Similarly, participants in the study group generated more 
academically relevant future thoughts occurring outside the classroom than those 
in the control group. 
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‘study’, and ‘unrelated’ events generated by the classroom and control groups.  
Critically, one comparison reached significance, such that participants in the  
classroom group were more likely to generate an academically relevant scenario 
occurring in the classroom than those in the control group (Z = 2.23, p = .013).   
A second chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the distribution of 
events generated by participants in the study group (i.e., 3 ‘classroom’ scenarios, 
18 ‘study’ scenarios, and 9 ‘unrelated’ scenarios) also differed significantly from 
the distribution of events generated by the control group (i.e., 5 ‘classroom’ 
scenarios, 11 ‘study’ scenarios, and 14 ‘unrelated’ scenarios), χ2 (2, N= 30) = 
7.04, p = .029.  This analysis was also followed with three a-priori contrasts that 
separately examined the difference in proportions of ‘classroom’, ‘study’, and 
‘unrelated’ events generated by the study and control groups.  Critically, one 
comparison reached significance, such that participants in the study group were 
more likely to generate an academically relevant scenario occurring outside the 
classroom than those in the control group (Z = 2.11, p = .017). 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment are important in two respects.  First, 
Experiment 2 serves as a conceptual replication of the findings obtained in 
Experiment 1.  Second, these results provide further evidence for the role of 
knowledge accessibility in episodic future thought.  Participants in the classroom 
and study groups were more likely than would be expected by chance to 
generate future episodes that were congruent with the relevant information that 
they had recently been exposed to in the context of a sentence construction task 
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(i.e., academic situations occurring within and outside the classroom, 
respectively). 
Experiment 3: Relating Episodic Future Thought to Other Open-ended 
Production Tasks 
 As was discussed earlier, the extent to which primed knowledge biases 
performance on open-ended production tasks (see Section 3) depends on how 
meaningfully that information is initially processed.  In order to examine whether 
a similar relationship exists in the context of episodic future thought, participants 
in Experiment 3 were asked to process scrambled word cues in either a 
conceptual manner (i.e., similar to Experiments 1 and 2) or in a structural 
manner.  If conceptually based processes moderate the relationship between 
primed knowledge and episodic future thought, then participants who process the 
scrambled word cues in a meaningful way should show more priming on a later 
episode generation task (for which the content of those cues is relevant; cf. 
Experiments 1 and 2) than participants who process those same cues in a non-
meaningful manner (i.e., counting vowels). 
Design 
There was one between-subjects variable, with 3 levels (priming condition: 
conceptual group, structural group, control group), in this experiment. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty undergraduates were recruited for each level of the between 
subjects variable, yielding a total of 90 participants for this experiment.  Two-
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thirds of the participants in each condition were tested at Washington University 
in St. Louis and one-third were tested at Iowa State University. 
Materials 
A separate set of materials was administered in each of the three phases 
of the experiment (i.e., sentence construction, math, simulation).  During the 
sentence construction phase (phase 1), participants generated meaningful 
sentences (or counted vowels) in response to scrambled arrangements of words.  
A total of 24 scrambled word cues were used in this experiment (see Appendix B 
for a complete list of stimuli).  Six of these scrambled word cues specified 
academic situations (same as Experiment 1) and 18 were control cues that did 
not converge on a specific situation (same control cues as Experiment 1).  During 
the delay period (phase 2), participants were asked to solve 6 math problems 
[e.g., (6 x 13)/2 = ?] (same problems as Experiment 1).  Finally, in the episode 
generation phase (phase 3), participants were asked to construct a personally 
relevant future event that might occur on or near their school campus within the 
next week (same as Experiment 1; see Appendix C). 
Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 3 was identical to that of Experiment 1, with 
the following exceptions.  Participants in the conceptual and structural groups 
were both presented with 6 scrambled word cues that could be used to generate 
sentences related to academic situations and 12 cues that did not converge on a 
specific situation.  As was the case in Experiment 1, participants in the 
conceptual group were asked to use these cues to construct meaningful 
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sentences.  Participants in the structural group, however, were asked to count 
the number of vowels that were present in each cue (i.e., scrambled arrangement 
of words) as quickly and as accurately as possible.  Responses for both groups 
were typed in a space provided directly below each cue.  Finally, participants in 
the control group were asked to generate meaningful sentences in response to 
the 18 scrambled word cues that did not converge on a specific situation. 
Results and Discussion 
Scoring Criteria 
All 90 participant-generated episodes were classified as either depicting 
an academic or unrelated scenario by two independent raters who were blind to 
experimental conditions.  Raters were instructed to score a scenario as 
‘academic’ if the event focused on the participant’s academic obligations (e.g., 
attending class, studying for a test), and as ‘unrelated’ if the event did not 
constitute an academic activity (e.g., walking around campus, going to a party). 
 The resulting inter-rater reliability was high, Κ = .90.  Any disagreements 
between raters were discussed and assigned to a single category.  This was only 
the case for 4 events.  Exclusion of these events did not change the general 
pattern of results and so these events were included in all subsequent analyses. 
Manipulation Check 
All 90 participants were unaware of the true purpose of the experiment at 
the time they generated their episodic future thought.  In fact, once prompted to 
guess the true purpose of the experiment, no participant was able to do so. 
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Distribution of Events 
The distribution of future episodes generated by participants in the 
conceptual, structural, and control groups is presented in Figure 6.  In order to 
examine whether the manner in which primed knowledge was processed 
moderated the influence of that information on the content of participant 
generated episodes, the distribution of events generated by participants in the 
conceptual and structural groups were separately contrasted against the 
distribution of events generated by participants in the control group. 
 First, a chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the distribution of 
events generated by participants in the conceptual group (i.e., 16 ‘academic’ 
scenarios and 14 ‘unrelated’ scenarios) differed significantly from the distribution 
of events generated by participants in the control group (i.e., 6 ‘academic’ 
scenarios and 24 ‘unrelated’ scenarios), χ2 (2, N= 30) = 20.83, p < .001.  This 
analysis was followed with two a-priori contrasts that separately examined the 
difference in proportions of ‘academic’ and ‘unrelated’ events generated by the 
conceptual and control groups.  Both comparisons reached significance.  
Critically, participants in the conceptual group were more likely to generate an 
academically relevant scenario than those in the control group (Z = 4.08, p < 
.001).  Further, participants in the control group were more likely to generate an 
unrelated scenario than those in the conceptual group (Z = 2.04, p = .021). 
A second chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the distribution of 
events generated by participants in the structural group (i.e., 8 ‘academic’ 
scenarios and 22 ‘unrelated’ scenarios) did not differ from the distribution of  
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Figure 6.  Results for Experiment 3. Proportion of event types generated as a 
function of priming condition.  Relative to the control group, participants in the 
conceptual group generated more academically relevant future thoughts.  
Conversely, participants in the structural group did not differ from those in the 
control group. 
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events generated by participants in the control group (i.e., 6 ‘academic’ scenarios 
and 24 ‘unrelated’ scenarios), χ2 < 1.  Importantly, participants in the structural 
group were found to spend a statistically similar amount of time completing their 
sentence task (i.e., counting vowels) as those in the conceptual group (who 
constructed meaningful sentences) (Ms = 6752 ms and 6552 ms, respectively; t 
< 1).  Hence, the lack of priming for the structural group, relative to the 
conceptual group, may be attributed to the absence of meaning-based 
processing of the sentence stimuli. 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment show clearly that conceptual processing 
moderates the relationship between priming and episodic future thought.  
Specifically, participants in the conceptual group were more likely to generate 
future episodes related to academic activities than those in the control group.  
Moreover, the structural and control groups did not differ from one another (cf. 
Srinivas & Roediger, 1990). 
General Discussion 
When one is cued to think about a personal future episode (either in daily 
life or in the laboratory) a specific scenario often comes to mind.  This prominent 
feature of episodic future thought is so familiar to those who possess the capacity 
that it may seem trivial.  However, there exists a large amount of personal 
knowledge that is relevant to any given cue to think about the future.  As such, 
there must exist some underlying cognitive mechanisms that determine which 
knowledge becomes incorporated.  Here, the results of three experiments 
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suggest that knowledge accessibility may represent one such mechanism.  Next, 
we will relate these findings to the relevant literature and discuss their broader 
implications. 
Knowledge Accessibility and its Relation to Future Thought 
The idea that knowledge accessibility might have an influence over the 
nature of one’s thoughts about the future is reminiscent of the role of heuristics 
and biases in human decision-making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  In 
particular, Tversky and Kahneman showed that participants’ estimates of the 
likelihood with which various events would occur in the future were influenced by 
the ease with which similar examples were retrieved from memory.  For example, 
when asked to estimate the probability that one’s car will be stolen in the future, 
people who have had experiences with car theft (either personally or vicariously) 
will estimate a higher probability of future car theft than those with little prior 
experience.  The authors referred to this process as the availability heuristic.  
Moreover, Tversky and Kahneman suggested that a similar heuristic might be at 
work when people think about rare events for which there may be no relevant 
memories to draw upon.  Specifically, the authors suggested that in thinking 
about unique events people generate hypothetical scenarios, and the ease with 
which such scenarios come to mind influences the estimated likelihood of their 
occurrence.  This particular process was later referred to as the simulation 
heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).  Importantly, both heuristics denote a 
close relationship between knowledge accessibility and future thinking.  That is, 
in both cases, accessible knowledge becomes cognitively available and people 
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are likely to base their judgments of future probability on that information (and 
how effortlessly it comes to mind; Schwarz, Bless, Wanke, & Winkielman, 2003).  
It is proposed that a similar principle underlies the mental construction of 
episodic future thought.  Specifically, the contents of episodic future thought 
seem, at least in part, to be shaped by readily accessible knowledge that is 
relevant to a personal future episode that one has in mind.  In the current 
experiments, participants were more likely than would be expected by chance to 
generate future episodes that were congruent with relevant information that they 
had experienced in the context of an earlier task.  In Experiment 1, for instance, 
participants were asked to think about a personal future episode that might occur 
on or near their school campus within the next week.  Given this specific set of 
constraints, the knowledge that participants could use to generate a scenario 
(e.g., information related to settings, people, and objects) was effectively 
delimited.  It was then possible to examine whether priming information relevant 
to one type of event (e.g., an academic situation) relative to another (e.g., a 
social situation) would shape the content of participant-generated episodes.  
Relative to a control group, participants who had been primed to think about 
information relevant to academic or social situations were more likely to generate 
academic or social scenarios, respectively.  This general pattern of results was 
replicated and extended upon in Experiment 2.  Specifically, in Experiment 2 the 
relevant knowledge base was further delimited by employing one additional 
constraint.  That is, participants were asked to think about a personal future 
episode that might occur on or near their school campus within the next week 
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and that was related to an academic situation.  Relative to a control group, 
participants who had been primed to think about information relevant to 
academic situations occurring inside or outside the classroom were more likely to 
generate academic scenarios occurring inside or outside the classroom, 
respectively. 
In both experiments, participants were asked to use scrambled 
arrangements of words (e.g., fun the was party boring) to construct sentences 
that were most relevant to them (e.g., ‘the party was fun’ versus ‘the party was 
boring’).  How is it that this priming task was so effective in shaping the theme of 
a personal future episode?  At this juncture, it might be premature to make any 
claims that go beyond the argument that engaging in the meaningful processing 
(cf. Experiment 3) of information relevant to an upcoming open-ended production 
task (episodic future thought, in this case) will shape the content of that task.  For 
instance, it will be interesting for future research to examine whether similar 
effects might be obtained with various other priming materials (e.g., pictorial 
stimuli).  Notwithstanding, some insights were gained from an informal post-
experiment interview.1   Specifically, participants tended to report that they used 
whatever personal experiences came to mind to help them decide how to 
complete each sentence (e.g., deciding whether a fun or boring party was more 
pertinent to them).  Hence, participants who were primed to think about 
information relevant to a particular type of situation (e.g., social) brought to mind 
relevant personal information that subsequently enhanced the likelihood of 
imagining a related experience occurring in the future.  In other words, perhaps 
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the nature of the priming materials used is not as important as the information 
that participants associate with those materials.  Prior research has shown that 
similar events take place in one’s recent past and future (D'Argembeau & Van 
der Linden, 2004; Spreng & Levine, 2006; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008).  Hence, 
recent experiences may provide a particularly useful source of information when 
thinking about upcoming events.  Of course, future research will need to more 
systematically evaluate these claims. 
On the basis of the present results, it is reasonable to assume (given a 
particular cue to think about the future) that knowledge accessibility fluctuates 
over time and that the exact content of episodic future thought will depend, in 
part, on the timing of the thought.  It will be interesting for future research to 
further examine the specificity of this effect.  For instance, all things being equal, 
is one more likely to imagine the same event in a particular setting, or incorporate 
a particular individual or object, based on their recent experiences?  The present 
results suggest that this should be the case.  Importantly, no assumptions are 
made regarding the nature of the underlying knowledge that is evoked in the 
construction of episodic future thought.  That is, this knowledge may be 
semantic, episodic, or any other form (cf. Forster & Liberman, 2007; Higgins, 
1996), as long as it is relatively accessible (Szpunar, in press). 
Thus far, discussion has focused on knowledge that is made temporarily 
accessible through recent thought about relevant information.  That is not to say, 
however, that other sources of accessibility do not exist.  For instance, research 
on impression formation has shown that some knowledge structures may be 
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chronically accessible as a result of either stable personality characteristics 
(Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Bargh & Thein, 1985; Higgins & Brendl, 
1995; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982) or frequent priming (of those knowledge 
structures) in the laboratory (Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Lombardi, 
Higgins, & Bargh, 1987).  In general, chronically accessible knowledge structures 
appear to exert more long-term influences on impression formation than 
temporarily accessible knowledge structures (for a review see Higgins, 1996).  It 
is certainly feasible that similar principles apply to episodic future thought.  For 
instance, some aspects of knowledge may be chronically accessible in relation to 
a specific future event if they have been frequently associated with thoughts 
about similar future events in the past.  Perhaps one good place to begin this 
particular line of inquiry would be to examine the relation between frequency of 
priming and the retention interval separating priming from episodic future 
thought. 
As is the case with any new area of research, the answer to one question 
opens the door for many others.  For instance, questions related to potential 
issues regarding priming materials, frequency of priming, and the delay between 
priming and episodic future thought have already been considered.  Each of 
these questions revolve around the theme of knowledge accessibility in episodic 
future thought and point to avenues through which the present findings may be 
extended in the future.  Next, we will shift focus and consider what occurs during 
the episodic future thought task itself.  Until now, there has been an almost 
implicit assumption in the literature that episodic future thought evokes mental 
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simulation (Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007, 2008; 
Szpunar, in press).  However, there exist no direct data to corroborate this claim.  
A better understanding of the level of representation that underlies episodic 
future thought will be necessary for understanding the relation between episodic 
future thought and knowledge accessibility.  Some directions for future research 
are considered below. 
Future Directions: Mental Simulation and Episodic Future Thought 
Evidence in support of the assumption that episodic future thought evokes 
mental simulation may be derived from two sources: 1) neuroimaging data 
showing that episodic future thought engages neural regions responsible for 
visual-spatial processing (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, in press; Addis et 
al., 2007; Botzung et al., 2008; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., in press; 
Szpunar et al., 2007) and simulation of bodily movements (Szpunar et al., 2007), 
and 2) subjective reports (e.g., D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 2006).  
However, arguments against these particular sources of evidence may be easily 
raised.  First, no neuroimaging study of episodic future thought has been 
conducted to directly test this assumption.  Thus, while the extant neuroimaging 
literature may suggest that episodic future thought engages regions associated 
with mental simulation, specific studies will need to be conducted in order to 
provide more substantive data.  One potential approach might be to query a priori 
regions of interest that have been identified in the mental simulation literature 
(e.g., Decety & Grezes, 2006; Grezes & Decety, 2001; Hesslow, 2002) and 
examine what patterns of activity are associated with episodic future thought in 
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those regions.  Second, although subjective reports are informative, they will 
need to be backed up by behavioral data.  To date, no such behavioral studies 
have been conducted.  Although we await such work, some preliminary 
considerations can be made with the situation model literature in mind. 
Thinking About Events: Situation Models   
Much of what one reads, hears, and thinks about in their daily life has to 
do with situations.  For instance, whether one is reading an interesting story in a 
newspaper article or listening to a friend retell a story about a recent weekend, 
one learns about a series of interconnected events that constitute a specific 
situation.  What mechanism underlies the ability to comprehend situations 
inherent in discourse?  Is the same mechanism involved regardless of the 
modality through which information about situations is learned?  Next, we will 
consider evidence that discourse comprehension is aided by the construction of 
high-level (referential) mental representations, namely situation models. 
 The ability to understand a described set of circumstances has been 
considered extensively in studies that examine memory for language and text.  
Specifically, researchers in this field have advanced the idea that memory for 
language and text involves three levels of representation: 1) the surface form 
(i.e., memory for specific words and syntax), 2) the propositional textbase (i.e., 
memory for ideas conveyed that are independent of wording), and 3) the 
situation model (i.e., memory for the described situation).  For present purposes, 
we will focus on mental representations at the level of the situation model (see 
Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). 
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 In their seminal study, Bradsford, Barclay, and Franks (1972) presented 
participants with sentence stimuli such as “Three turtles rested on a log and a 
fish swam beneath them.”  In a later recognition phase, participants were likely to 
misidentify the sentence “Three turtles rested on a log and a fish swam beneath 
it” as having been studied in the exposure phase.  The authors claimed that the 
effect occurred because both sentences describe the same situation.  In contrast, 
participants were less likely to make the error when presented with the sentence 
“Three turtles rested beside a log and a fish swam beneath them” in the 
exposure phase and the sentence “Three turtles rested beside a log and a fish 
swam beneath it” in the recognition phase.  Although this latter pair of sentences 
also differed by only one word (i.e., them or it), the situations described by these 
sentences were decidedly different.  This pattern of results suggested that 
participant’s memories for text were guided by the described situation and not by 
the language itself (see also Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987). 
 Since then, a considerable amount of research has shown that people 
form multidimensional situation models that aid in the comprehension of 
discourse.  Among the various components of situation models that have 
received empirical attention are spatial-temporal frameworks (i.e., the location in 
space and time, or context, in which an event tasks place), tokens and their 
interrelations (i.e., the relevant people and objects that are embedded within a 
specific spatial-temporal framework, their relevant properties, spatial 
arrangement, and so on), and linking relations among a series of spatial-temporal 
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frameworks (e.g., temporal, casual) (for a detailed review see Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998; for a more recent discussion see Radvansky, 2008). 
 According to Radvansky (2008), situation models are “mental simulations” 
(p. 230) of a described set of circumstances (see also Zwaan, 1999).  Of course, 
that claim does not necessarily mean that people construct life-like (or image-
based) mental representations in their minds when processing discourse (cf. 
McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992).  Rather, most researchers in this field subscribe to the 
view that discourse comprehension is aided by the construction of high-level, 
abstract, mental representations of situations (cf. Barsalou, 1999).  This view is 
supported by findings that comprehension performance is highly similar across 
modality.  For instance, Baggett (1979) found that participants who viewed a 
short film depicting a series of events produced structurally similar recall 
protocols as participants who heard a spoken version of the story.  In another 
study, Gernsbacher, Varner, and Faust (1990) found that comprehension of 
various forms of discourse (e.g., reading, listening, viewing) was highly correlated 
within participants.  That is, participants who were good at comprehending 
written materials were also good at comprehending auditory materials, and so 
on.  This latter finding makes little sense if one assumes that participants in this 
experiment only created a mental representation of the discourse itself.  
However, it makes sense if one assumes that participants constructed higher-
level representations of the situations described in the discourse (irrespective of 
modality). 
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Relevance to Episodic Future Thought 
On the basis of the evidence that people generate high-level, abstract, 
representations about the situations that they read and hear about, it does not 
seem too much of a stretch to suggest that people may rely upon a similar 
mechanism when thinking about the situations they generate in the course of 
episodic future thought.  By definition, episodic future thought involves thinking 
about specific events, or situations, that one might potentially encounter in their 
personal life (Szpunar, in press).  While there exists no experimental evidence to 
corroborate this claim, simply examining participant generated protocols of future 
scenarios provides some clues.  For instance, consider again the scenario 
generated by the sample participant in Table 1.  The sample participant 
generated a scenario that took place in a specific spatial-temporal framework 
(i.e., a familiar beach), involved various tokens and their interrelations (e.g., the 
participant’s friends, beach ware; spatial relations between people and objects), 
and contained various linking relations that served to connect a series of events 
into a coherent representation of one specific scenario (i.e., the participant 
described a series of events that will occur, one after the other, in the course of 
spending a day on the beach).   It will be interesting for future research to 
examine whether these features of episodic future thought are mentally 
represented in a way that complements relevant work in the situation model 
literature.  With regard to knowledge accessibility, if it turns out that certain 
materials are better able to prime episodic future thought, then it will be 
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informative to have a clear understanding of how participants are representing 
those thoughts. 
Concluding Remarks 
 The present findings are meant to represent an initial step towards a more 
complete understanding of the capacity for the human mind/brain to flexibly 
(re)organize knowledge in the construction of personal future episodes.  Although 
it is clear that there is much to learn about episodic future thought, two important 
points deserve mention.  First, episodic future thought represents a cognitive 
capacity that is amenable to inquiry in the behavioral laboratory.  Much of our 
current understanding of episodic future thought has been gained through 
studies conducted with patient populations and neuroimaging techniques.  
Although these approaches will doubtless continue to provide insights into this 
fascinating capacity, examining episodic future thought from a behavioral 
standpoint will also be informative and useful.  Second, episodic future thought 
shares features in common with other cognitive tasks.  Drawing upon those 
relations helped to provide insight and justification for conducting the current set 
of experiments.  Moreover, the outcome of these experiments revealed that 
principles that have previously been identified with tasks that might arguably lack 
ecological validity (e.g., name the first eight animals that come to mind) hold in 
the context of a mental activity that people engage in on a daily basis 
(D'Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2009).  Such comparisons 
emphasize the importance of examining the relations between tasks that often 
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times receive little crosstalk but that may, when examined together, highlight 
underlying principles of cognitive functioning. 
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Footnote 
 
 1 The final 55 participants who were run in the present set of three 
experiments were asked to identify any strategies that they might have engaged 
in to help them to construct sentences from the scrambled arrangements of 
words. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Partial transcript of informal interview 
 
--A personal future episode from a sample participant (Table 1)-- 
 
 
Question about general event 
 
Experimenter (E): Why do you think you thought about this specific event? 
 
Participant (P): I’ve been thinking a lot lately about taking a vacation with some of my friends this 
summer.  It will be the last chance we’ll have for fun before graduate school. 
 
 
Questions about setting 
 
E: Why do you think this event occurred where it did? 
 
P: Well, I’d like to take a trip somewhere that has a nice beach.  Nice was the first place that 
came to mind. 
 
E: How familiar are you with this specific location? 
 
P: Well, I’ve been to Nice before so…pretty familiar. 
 
E: How many times have you been to the particular beach you imagined? 
 
P: Just once.  Last time I was there, we spent a short time at the beach and I remember wanting 
to go back one day. 
 
E: Why do you think you specifically imagined being on the beach and not doing something else, 
like site seeing? 
 
P: I guess it’s because I want to take a vacation to a place where I can just sit back in the sun. 
But, of course, I’ll want to do other things while I’m there.  That city is something else. 
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Appendix B 
 
Scrambled word cues (and sample completions) 
 
 
Social situations (6) – Experiment 1 
 
1) movies group the watched television (e.g., the group watched movies) 
2) fun the was party boring (e.g., the party was fun) 
3) played friends cards sports the (e.g., the friends played sports) 
4) lunch the dinner roommates ate (e.g., the roommates ate dinner) 
5) was workout their short long (e.g., their workout was long) 
6) pleasant date was awkward the (e.g., the date was pleasant) 
 
 
 
Academic situations (6) – Experiments 1 and 3 
 
1) teacher the quickly spoke slowly (e.g., the teacher spoke slowly) 
2) interesting lecture the was boring (e.g., the lecture was interesting) 
3) class late the early ended (e.g., the class ended early) 
4) night all studied procrastinated he (e.g., he studied all night) 
5) was homework the easy hard (e.g., the homework was easy) 
6) library the peaceful was noisy (e.g., the library was noisy) 
 
 
 
Classroom situations (6) – Experiment 2 
 
1) teacher the quickly spoke slowly (e.g., the teacher spoke quickly)* 
2) interesting lecture the was boring (e.g., the lecture was interesting)* 
3) class late the early ended (e.g., the class ended early)* 
4) took notes she skimpy detailed (e.g., she took detailed notes) 
5) ignored the teacher questions answered (e.g., the teacher answered questions) 
6) student was lecturer the presenting (e.g., the student was presenting) 
 
* same as Experiments 1 and 3  
 
 
 
Non-classroom situations (6) – Experiment 2 
 
1) night all studied procrastinated he (e.g., he studied all night)* 
2) was homework the easy hard (e.g., the homework was easy)* 
3) library the peaceful was noisy (e.g., the library was noisy)* 
4) her long short was essay (e.g., her essay was short) 
5) memorized notes she her rehearsed (e.g., she memorized her notes) 
6) uninteresting the was uninteresting book (e.g., the book was interesting) 
 
* same as Experiments 1 and 3 
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Control cues (18) – Experiments 1, 2, and 3 
 
1) is boy the tall short (e.g., the boy is tall) 
2) sad girl the happy is (e.g., the girl is happy) 
3) rabbit cute is ugly the (e.g., the rabbit is cute) 
4) the rude is kind man (e.g., the man is rude) 
5) is cut the grass green (e.g., the grass is green) 
6) small plane the large is (e.g., the plane is large) 
7) weak chair the is sturdy (e.g., the chair is sturdy) 
8) hard ball is the soft (e.g., the ball is soft) 
9) stopped the suddenly skidded car (e.g., the car stopped suddenly) 
10) fast slow tractor is the (e.g., the tractor is slow) 
11) young woman felt the old (e.g., the woman felt young) 
12) object is the heavy light (e.g., the object is light) 
13) the is old new clock (e.g., the clock is new) 
14) is snake the long short (e.g., the snake is long) 
15) flew kite high far the (e.g., the kite flew high) 
16) orange is yellow boat the (e.g., the boat is yellow) 
17) is window the clean dirty (e.g., the window is clean) 
18) full box is the empty (e.g., the box is full) 
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Appendix C 
 
Episode Generation Instructions 
 
 
Experiments 1 and 3 
 
In the space below, please describe an event involving you somewhere on or near campus within 
the next week.  This can be about anything, so long as it involves you somewhere on, or close to, 
campus.  Just describe the first event that comes to mind.  Please describe where the event 
takes place and what is happening. 
 
 
 
Experiment 2 
 
In the space below, please describe an academically relevant event involving you somewhere on 
or near campus within the next week.  This can be about anything, so long as it involves you on, 
or close to, campus doing something related to your schooling.  Just describe the first event that 
comes to mind.  Please describe where the event takes place and what is happening. 
 
 
 
